practice vary, so women's and men's relation to normative constructions of masculinities and femininities vary.
In a discussion of an experimental setting (Freed & Greenwood 1996 ) that produced similar linguistic behavior, i.e. a cooperative speech style, in both female and male subjects -same-sex friends in casual conversation -Freed (1996:67) provides a more concrete description of the way in which gender is produced through involvement in certain social practices or activities:
First, participating in the same practice produced in the women and men the same kind of talk; second, outside of this experimental setting, it is possible that women and men would be less likely to find themselves in such similar settings, given the sex-and gender-differentiated society in which we live ... Thus language and gender studies conducted in natural settings may often find differences, not similarities, in women's and men's speech simply because women and men are frequently engaged in different activities (see M. Goodwin 1990) and not because of any differences in women and men themselves. Since it is increasingly clear that speech patterns are products of the activities that people are engaged in and not inherent to the participants, we can conclude that communicative styles are customs related to actions, activities and behaviors differentially encouraged for women and men.
Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, like Freed, posit an indirect relationship between gender and language, a relationship "mediated by the crucial variable of practice" (Cameron 1996:45) . By locating gender construction in the myriad communities of practice in which individuals participate over a lifetime, the "community of practice" framework allows for more local accounts of the relationship between language and gender, and a shift away from overarching generalizations about women, men, and "gendered" speech styles.
In this article, I investigate the utility of Eckert and McConnell-Ginet's community of practice model for an analysis of the language used by women in a sexual assault tribunal. As I have argued elsewhere (Ehrlich & King 1996 , Ehrlich 1998), the questions asked by institutional representatives in institutional discourse can perform ideological work (Fisher 1991) . More specifically, I have shown how the questions asked by two tribunal members (a man and a woman faculty member), in a university sexual "harassment" tribunal, function to (re)-frame and (re)construct the events in question as consensual sex. That is, although the woman complainants (i.e. victims) in the tribunal characterize their experiences as sexual assault, two of the tribunal members -one of whom is a woman faculty member -ask questions that presuppose the inadequacy and deficiency of the complainants' signals of resistance, suggesting that their so-called lack of resistance was tantamount to consent. Clearly, any homogeneous notion of "woman's speech style" or "woman's point of view" would fail to account for the differences between the discursive patterns of this woman tribunal member Language in Society 28:2 (1999) and the women complainants in this context. But if, as argued by Eckert & McConnell-Ginet (1992a,b) , our linguistic practices arise from the kinds of community of practice with which we are involved, then an understanding of such local practices and activities should provide greater insight into the differential linguistic behavior of the women involved in this sexual "harassment" tribunal. Therefore, in the remainder of this article, I consider the different kinds of community of practice in which these women participate (i.e. the tribunal member vs. the complainants), as a way of understanding the different discursive frames that emerge in the talk of this sexual assault tribunal.
UNIVERSITY DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL
The data presented here were transcribed from audiotaped recordings of a disciplinary tribunal at York University (Canada), dealing with sexual harassment. York University disciplinary tribunals are university trials which operate outside the provincial or federal legal system. Members of the university community can be tried for various kinds of misconduct, including unauthorized entry or access, theft or destruction of property, assault or threat of assault and harassment, and discrimination that contravenes the provincial Human Rights Code or the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Each case is heard by three tribunal members, who are drawn from a larger pool consisting of university faculty members and students.2 Penalties range from public admonition to expulsion from the university. Normally these tribunals are open to the public. In the case described here, two charges of sexual harassment had been brought against a man student (the defendant) by two women students (the complainants), all undergraduates at York University. The tribunal members hearing the case consisted of a man who was a faculty member in the Law Faculty (the tribunal's chair), a woman who was a faculty member in the Faculty of Arts, and a woman graduate student in the Faculty of Arts. The case against the defendant was presented by the university's legal counsel. According to the regulations of York University, sexual harassment is defined as "the unwanted attention of a sexually oriented nature made by a person who knows or ought reasonably to know that such attention is unwanted." The defendant was charged by the same plaintiffs under the Canadian Criminal Code on two counts of sexual assault.3 While the defendant's behavior fell under the category of sexual assault under the Canadian criminal code, York University's rules and regulations do not include sexual assault as a possible offense. Thus, within the context of York University, the defendant was charged with sexual harassment. In colloquial terms, the defendant had been accused of two instances of "acquaintance rape" or "date rape." These instances occurred in the women's dormitory rooms two nights apart. Each woman had invited the defendant to her room, and in both cases he allegedly persisted in unwanted sexual behavior. Both women reported that they were quite clear and insistent that he stop, but their demands were ignored. In one case, another man and woman were in the room while the unwanted sexual behavior took place; the woman served as a witness for the prosecution's case. The two complainants were casual acquaintances prior to the alleged instances of sexual harassment. They met coincidentally a short time after the incidents and discovered each other's experience with the defendant; each then lodged a complaint of sexual harassment.
Although it is not technically a criminal court of law, the York University disciplinary tribunal functions like one in that each side, the prosecution and the defense, presents its version of the events at issue to the members of the disciplinary tribunal. As others have noted (e.g. Atkinson & Drew 1979, Walker 1987, Conley & O'Barr 1990), courtroom talk assigns differential participation rights to individuals depending on their institutional role: Questioners in legal contexts have the power to allocate turns, to frame the topic of questions, and even to restrict the nature of responses through the syntactic manipulation of questions. In the case described here, the complainants, the defendant, and their witnesses testified under questioning by their own representatives (the defendant was represented by his mother, a family friend, and himself) and by the tribunal members. All participants were also cross-examined by representatives from the other side. Thus, in contrast to jury trials, the "talk" of this disciplinary tribunal was not designed for an overhearing, non-speaking audience -the jury (Atkinson & Drew 1979) -but rather for members of the disciplinary tribunal who themselves had the right to question the defendant, complainants, and witnesses. In ex. 3, the tribunal member has difficulty phrasing her question -as indicated by a couple of false starts, and her admission that she doesn't know how to phrase the question. This difficulty is perhaps related to her desire to assert ( Until the 1950s and 1960s, in Canada and the US, the requirement of utmost resistance was a necessary criterion for the crime of rape (Estrich 1987) ; that is, if a woman did not resist a man's sexual advances to the utmost, then rape did not occur.' Although the criterion of utmost resistance is not currently encoded in criminal definitions of rape in Canada and the US, Crenshaw (1992:409) notes that a similar concept is often operative in the adjudication of rape and sexual harassment cases. When the female tribunal member asks questions and makes assertions that presuppose the inadequacy of the complainant's and her witness's behavior, in exx. 1-4, I suggest that she is invoking the criterion of "utmost resistance." That is, in representing the women as not having pursued appropriate "options," GK is questioning whether they have resisted to the utmost. Without "utmost resistance," the events in question begin to get (re)constructed by the female tribunal member as consensual sex.
The most frequent response to questions concerning the complainants' and the witness's so-called "passive" behavior, in spite of "options," was that they had been motivated by fear, as in exx. 1, 3, and 4. Indeed, when asked throughout the tribunal why they didn't pursue certain avenues of resistance, both the complainLanguage in Society 28:2 (1999) ants and their witness typically pointed to their intense and extreme feelings of fear. After the complainants' and witnesses' expressions of fear (and these occurred numerous times during the testimony and questioning), the tribunal members generally followed with questions attempting to deconstruct the cause or source of the fear. This can be seen in ex. 5, in which the chair of the tribunal, the male faculty member, is questioning Connie, the other complainant. Here we see the questioner again trying to isolate the precise aspects of the defendant, or the defendant's behavior, that were frightening to the witness. These attempts to pinpoint so precisely and specifically the causes of the women's fear have the effect of reducing or minimizing it. Indeed, in the second line of ex. 6, BW comments that the ONLY time the witness has expressed her fear of the defendant is in relation to the eavesdropping incident. It seems that it was not sufficient for the women simply to report that the defendant "was a very scary guy" or "sounding very angry." Through this tribunal member's questioning, and his attempts to impute the women's fear to very specific aspects of the defendant or his behavior, its potential impact on the women's behavior is called into question.
In the last part of ex. 6, we see the tribunal member cutting Melinda off and rephrasing her comments about her fear of Matt. What begins as a description of how intimidating the witness found the defendant ("I think Matt is a very intimidating person") is transformed into the witness feeling frightened only twice over the course of events ("The two times in the evening that you found Matt scary ..."). We see here how the attempt to deconstruct the witness's fear has the effect of diminishing it. Minimizing the complainants' and the witness's fear serves to remove the motivation for the women's behavior -specifically, why they didn't pursue "options" deemed appropriate by the female tribunal member. This is the two-part discursive strategy that functions to construct and define the events in question as consensual sex, rather than sexual harassment or acquaintance rape: First, the women's so-called lack of resistance is established through questions that presuppose that other options for "action" are available; second, the explanation for the women's "passive" behavior (i.e. their extreme fear of the defendant) is minimized and/or eliminated through questions that discount the paralyzing and pervasive nature of the women's fear. With the motivation for the complainants' behavior eliminated, their apparent lack of resistance can be construed as meaning that the sexual activity was consensual.
NEGOTIATING MEANINGS
I have argued up to now that the questions asked by the male and female faculty tribunal members function to characterize or construct the events in question in a particular way. That is, these two tribunal members jointly construct an interpretive "frame" which minimizes the complainants' and witness's acts of resistance and the motivation for these acts, and ultimately functions to (re)construct the events as consensual sex. This is not to say, however, that the complainants subscribe to this same interpretation of the events. Thus in ex. 5 we see the complainant, Connie, commenting on her lack of choice during the events, and on the fact that Matt's utterances were demands, not requests. Other comments from Connie's testimony suggest that the complainants DID resist the defendant's sexual aggression, even if they did not pursue the "options" suggested by the female tribunal member. In ex. 7, Connie is answering a question from the male tribunal member about the possibility that she and the defendant had different understandings of what constituted non-consent on her part. This example is fairly typical of the way that the tribunal members' assumptions and concerns prevail in these interactions, because of the questioner's control. Note that the tribunal members are free to speculate during the course of the proceedings without being interrupted or cut off by a questioner, whereas Melinda is prevented from speculating as to why Bob was frightened by Matt. Indeed, one of the tribunal members speculates frequently on "options" that the complainants had: "I see an option. It may not have occurred to you but I simply want to explore that option with you. Uh ... did it occur to you that you could lock the room so that they may not return to your room?" (from ex. 2). As Walker (1987:79) says, regarding lawyers or judges who are legally sanctioned to question witnesses: "Choice belongs to the examiner, who because of his socially and legally sanctioned role ... has the right to present, characterize, limit and otherwise direct the flow of testimony. It is in the hands of the questioner that the real power lies." Similarly, I have attempted to demonstrate that the assumptions and presuppositions underlying the male and female faculty members' questions had the effect of (re)structuring and (re)constructing the complainants' experiences of sexual assault.
COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE, GENDER, AND SEXUAL ASSAULT OUTCOME OF THE TRIBUNAL PROCEEDINGS
The tribunal found the defendant's behavior to have fallen substantially below university standards. More specifically, their decision stated that both complainants were unresponsive to the defendant's sexual advances, that the defendant demonstrated an indifference to the complainants' wishes, and that the defendant's actions were disrespectful and insensitive. While the tribunal's decision acknowledged that some unwanted sexual aggression occurred, it also continued to minimize and discredit the complainants' feelings of fear (as the two tribunal members did during the proceedings):
Both complainants testified that they were deeply frightened by Mr. A.; whereas their actions seemed to undercut this claim. For example, both complainants remained in the room with Mr. A. after the sexual activity had finished and he had fallen asleep. It seems somewhat inconsistent to assert fear on the one hand and on the other hand to be comfortable enough to fall asleep alongside the feared individual. In my opinion, this inconsistency (and perhaps overstatement of the level of fear experienced) can be explained by the fact that, prior to the two complainants meeting on Jan. 30, 1993, both complainants felt ashamed that they had allowed the situation with Mr. A. to progress to a level beyond their control. Both complainants testified that they felt confusion and shame when they individually reflected upon their experiences. It was only during their coincidental meeting of Jan. 30, 1993 that they were able to recognize the fact that they had been violated, and their indignation in making this discovery might have led to a slight overstatement of their position. (York 1994:18) By discrediting the women's feelings of fear, the tribunal's decision again focuses on the women's behavior, and it raises the possibility that the women's "inaction" or "lack of resistance" was curious, perhaps unjustified. While deeming Mr. A's behavior to fall "below the standard of conduct we must expect from all members of the University community" (p. 22), the tribunal did not accept the university legal counsel's recommendation regarding sanctions. Expulsion from the university was judged to be unjustified: Mr. A. was clearly insensitive and disrespectful to the complainants and this insensitivity led to harm; however I do believe that Mr. A. will be far more careful, caring and sensitive in the future. Considering that we do not find that he poses a threat, it is our view that if there is any institution in which Mr. A. can be sensitized to the need for respecting the sexual autonomy of women, it would be in a university setting.
Rustication would be counter-productive to the educational mission which must be part and parcel of the University's disciplinary process. (York 1994:37) .
Thus the decision was to allow the defendant to continue his studies, but to bar his access to various parts of the university, including its dormitories. I suggest that such a penalty is lenient for two convictions of sexual harassment or acquain- Since the early 20th century, courts in the US have found it useful to invoke the notion of "a reasonable person" in considering whether certain kinds of behavior should be deemed harmful or offensive and thus punishable. The "reasonable person" is supposed to represent community norms; thus whatever would offend or harm "a reasonable person" is said to be more generally offensive or harmful. Feminist legal scholars (e.g. Abrams 1989) have recently challenged the generalizability of "a reasonable person's" experiences, arguing that men and women may experience sexual advances or sexual harassment differently. Indeed, some state courts and lower federal courts in the US have modified the "reasonable person" standard and introduced "a reasonable woman" standard for evaluating charges of sexual harassment. One such US court justifies introducing the "reasonable women" standard in the following way:
We realize that there is a broad range of viewpoints among women as a group, but we believe that many women share common concerns which men do not necessarily share. For example, because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior ... We adopt the perspective of a reasonable woman pri-marily because we believe that a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to systematically ignore the experiences of women. (Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 [9th Cir. 1991]) Of relevance to the tribunal proceedings under discussion here is the fact that the questions asked by the two tribunal members stem from a profound ignorance of the complainants' experiences. Questions such as "Why didn't you leave the room?," "Why didn't you lock the door?," "Why didn't you put him on the floor?," "Why didn't you talk to Bob?" do not take seriously the complainants' and witness's frequent expressions of fear, paralysis, and humiliation in the context of sexual violence. That is, most of the tribunal's proceedings are structured by the assumptions of "a reasonable man"; they are "male-biased" and tend "to systematically ignore the experiences of women."
The fact that a disciplinary tribunal at a major university in Canada is androcentric in its procedures and decision-making process is not in itself surprising. For Marxist scholars such as Antonio Gramsci, the cultural hegemony of the ruling class is developed through the institutions of a society. Among the range of structures and activities that would undoubtedly function to promulgate an institution's dominant belief-system are the discourses of that institution. Indeed, Gal (1991:197) talks about the non-neutrality of institutional discourse: "Institutions are far from neutral arenas: They are structured along gender lines, to lend authority not only to reigning classes and ethnic groups but specifically to men's linguistic practices." In the sexual assault case described here, the androcentric discourse that dominates is one that is co-constructed by a man and woman faculty member. These tribunal members constitute a "community of practice"; i.e., they are mutually engaged on a regular basis in university disciplinary tribunals in which members of the university community are tried for various kinds of misconduct. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that BOTH the female and male tribunal members jointly construct an interpretive "frame" that minimizes the complainants' resistance, and ultimately functions to (re)construct the events as consensual sex. Members of university disciplinary tribunals presumably represent the university's interests as opposed to any particular individual's interests. In addition, these particular members of the university disciplinary tribunal are faculty members (not students), and they therefore represent a powerful constituency within the university. That is, in being both a faculty member and a member of a university disciplinary tribunal, the woman tribunal member is invested with the responsibility of upholding the standards and values of the institutionstandards and values that do not necessarily serve the interests of many women.
As Eckert & McConnell-Ginet argue (1992b:97), constructions of femininity arise out of participation in a variety of communities of practice. Thus they are variable across women, and dynamic within a single individual:
And so although the identity of both the individual and the individual community of practice is experienced as persistent, in fact they both change conLanguage in Society 28:2 (1999) stantly. We continue to adopt new ways of being women and men, gays and lesbians and heterosexuals, even changing our ways of being feminists or being lovers or being mothers or being sisters. In becoming police officers or psychiatrists or physicists or professors of linguistics, we may change our ways of being women and perhaps of being wives or lovers or mothers ... And there are many more unnamed ways of thinking, being, relating, and doing that we adopt and adapt as we participate in different ways in the various communities of practice to which we belong.
As a representative of the university, entrusted with upholding the institution's dominant cultural values, GK's "way of being women" departs dramatically from that of the victims of the sexual assault: undergraduate students at the same institution. In the context of the university tribunal, the woman faculty member exhibits an androcentric perspective on violence against women, to the extent that she ignores the socially structured differences between men and women that may have influenced the complainants' perceptions of harm and danger in a situation of male sexual aggression. By considering the very different kinds of community of practice in which these women participate (i.e. the tribunal member vs. complainants) -or, put another way, the way in which gender interacts with other aspects of social identity -we can perhaps understand the different discursive frames that emerged in the talk of this sexual assault tribunal.
Until now I have argued that the women involved in this sexual harassment tribunal have different ways of discursively constructing the events in question. A complicating factor, however, is the way in which gender/sex difference is strategically invoked within this context.6 In spite of the fact that the female faculty member implicitly applies the "utmost resistance" standard through her questioning of the female complainants, she is perceived as "biased" in favor of the complainants by the accused and his representatives. Indeed, all the women involved in this tribunal are perceived as biased in favor of the complainants by the defendant and his representatives. The following comments from the defendant's representative are illustrative: (8) TM: Clearly bias has been directed against Matt from the beginning. I am suggesting that he has perceived and the family has perceived, that the university has been biased against him. Uh I'd like to just make part of the record that during testimony prior to today's, uh Ms. Levine [the student tribunal member] uh openly exhibited bias against Matt by shaking her head, and making verbal sounds, that showed her displeasure at Matt's alleged behavior. Uh, this bias so unnerved Matt, that he was unable adequately to continue to represent himself on March the twenty-sixth nineteen ninety three, and I would suggest that this probably is the strategy of that panel member. In seeking a source of understanding and counsel for his predicament, Matt went to the sexual harassment [center] of the university only to be told that that was for women only. Of equal significance is the fact that women are aligned against him at every part of the administrative and judicial stage. The resident tutor is a woman, the director of student affairs is a woman, the university counsel is a woman, the majority on the tribunal is a woman, although I don't have a pro-with women, I don't have a problem with that, but, the final court of appeal, the president is also uh a woman. In short, all the university's actions suggest partiality towards the complainants up to the point of this panel. I'm not suggesting that uh you ladies and gentleman are, but I'm suggesting that prior to this panel beginning, the university's actions certainly suggest partiality.
Not only does the defendant's representative invoke sex/gender in a strategic way, but in exx. 9-10 we see the female tribunal member also appealing to her sex/gender as a way of warding off charges that her line of questioning has been harassing of the complainants.
(9) GK: Connie, before I ask you any questions that, I would really like you to know that I know how you must feel, and I really need some information, and that these questions are to be taken as completely neutral information-seeking questions, and if in the process I upset you I apologize at the outset. But we need the information simply to understand the situation. The precise political effects of "gender polarization," as manifest in the proceedings described here, are difficult to determine. In imputing a unified perspective to all the women involved in the tribunal proceedings, the defendant's representative and the female faculty member may be neutralizing this tribunal member's androcentric (re)construction of the events. As she herself says, "In asking questions I'm a woman, I'm quite sensitive to what's happening." Whatever the effects, however, it is clear that the invocation of gender essentialism is a powerful and pervasive social practice, with varying political and strategic effects. As I have demonstrated here, the community of practice notion allows us to focus on how gender is constructed in "its full complexity," moving us away from overly general claims about "gendered" speech styles. Yet in spite of the complex nature of social identities, certain aspects of social identity (including gender) can be taken up and imposed on individuals for strategic and political purposes. l At least two types of explanations are offered for the linguistic differences between women and men documented in research of the 1970s and 1980s (cf. Cameron 1990). The first type of explanation, characterized as the dominance approach, sees male dominance as operative in the everyday verbal interactions of women and men, giving rise to linguistic reflexes of subordination and dominance. The second type of explanation, characterized as the difference approach, suggests that women and men learn different communicative styles based on the segregated same-sex peer groups they play in as children. 2 The pool of tribunal members consists of three faculty members and three students nominated by the dean of the university's law school; three faculty members nominated by the governing council of the university's residential colleges; three students nominated by the undergraduate student union; and three faculty members and three students nominated by the vice-president for campus relations.
3 Criminal charges against the defendant reached some resolution in spring 1995, when he was convicted of one of the two charges of sexual assault, and was sentenced to six months in jail. That conviction was appealed. colon indicates an extension of the sound or syllable it follows italics indicates emphatic stress ((sniff)) double parentheses indicate details of the conversational scene or vocalizations 5Estrich says that the "utmost resistance" standard was generally replaced by a "reasonable resistance" standard by the 1950s and 1960s in the United States; but she also cites decisions as late as 1973 which contend that "rape is not committed unless the woman opposes the man to the utmost limit of her power" (Estrich 1987:129) . 6 The distinction between sex and gender was originally an attempt by feminist researchers in the 1970s and 1980s to separate biological categories (sex) from social ones (gender). In more recent years, some feminist theorists (e.g. Bem 1993, 1996, Butler 1990) have argued that both sex and gender are socially constructed. Bem 1996 cites the work of a developmental geneticist, Anne FaustoSterling, who argues that sex is a continuum that ought to be divided not into just two sexes, but into at least five. The fact that intersexed individuals are regularly assigned to the categories of male or female provides some evidence for the claim that sex, like gender, is socially constructed. In Butler's words (1990:8), "to what extent does the body COME INTO BEING in and through the mark(s) of gender?" 7McElhinny (1996:476) has labeled this practice "strategic essentialism" and has pointed to the potential political efficacy of the practice for aspects of feminism:
Patricia Hill Collins has acknowledged that a standpoint approach does underestimate differences among Black women, and thus unravels under closer scrutiny. But she argued that at this political moment, a strategic essentialism is necessary, in order to get Black feminist thought taken seriously as an area of intellectual inquiry.
More generally, the mobilizing of political action around seemingly "stable" and "unified" social identities ("identity politics") can, arguably, be viewed as a positive outcome of strategic essentialism.
